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I. , , .. INTRODUCTION 
Rivers or lakes are considered to be international if their ••. 
surface settings traverse the territories of two or more states. In the 
case of a river it may form whole or part of the boundary of two or more 
states; alternatively, it may flow successively, through two or more 
states , or a combination of both; in the case of a lake, it may actually' 
be shared-by two or more states. Thus, rivers or lakes as such are 
distinguishable from the concept of drainage basin, where the latter 
is broader, constituting, thr5 entire catchment area which contribut es both, 
the surface and ground water towards a common terminus. 
There are about fifty-four international rivers and lakes in 
Africa. Out of that total, eleven drain the territories of four or more 
states, with the largest number of states drained by any one river being 
ten. Nineteen basins drain areas more than 100,000 square kilometres, and in 
all, the area drained by t,hese international rivers and. lakes is about half 
of the total areas of the continent"1'. And that, certainly, is considerable 
reticulation of water systems in this vast continent. 
Attempts to organise the basin states towards the management of 
the water systems have been done only in the following instances: Niger 
Basin Authority (NBA); Organisation for the Management of Senegal Basin 
(0MVS): Organization for the Management of Gambia Basin (0MVG); Kagera Basin 
Organization (KB0); Chad Basin Commission (CB0); and the Permanent Joint 
Technical Committee (PJTC), tstween Egypt and Sudan on the Nile Waters. 
Currently, the United Nations- Environment Programme (UNEP), under'its 
programme for environmentally sound management of inland waters (EMINWA) is 
initiating an integrated regional development programme for the Zambezi 
river, later to be followed by Lake Tanganyika. 
1. These data have been gleaned from the records at the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa. For a summary see UNECA, Problems of Water 
Resources in Africa. Doc. No. E/CN,14/NRD/WR/1/Rev.2 October 21, 1976 
(Addis Ababa, 1976J p.49. 
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The purpose of the present paper is not to review the management 
regimes of these organizations. Rather, it will examine some of the macro-
policy questions of the state involvement in actual management and 
utilization of the waters of any basin in Africa. No attempt will be made 
to draw on the precise and detailed experience and example from the 
existing drainage basin organizations as far as the role of-the state 
is concerned. Instead, the paper will take up selected issues and 
concepts and point to experiences with the utilization of river waters 
for the promotion of socio-economic goals at national or regional levels. 
In other words', the paper takes the position that whether the management 
and utilization of the, water is done within the national or regional 
framework, the role of the state will evince certain common conditions and 
the net results are similar when "^^-^at from the perspective of 
promotion of socio-economic' well-being of the human population. 
.: To set the stage for the discussion, the paper will begin with a 
brief outline of the significance or justification of the management of 
water resources on a basin-wide basis. Secondly, it will outline some of 
the justifications for state involvement in the management of such basir, 
waters. In the process, we should see some of the salient activities 
which the state is to be expected to perform. Thirdly, despite the 
imperatives of state involvement, there are a number of draw-backs j.n "the 
state performing the roles; the next part of the paper is intended to 
outline some of such caveats, posed as criticisms. It is expected that the 
discussion should automatically suggest the limitations of state involvement 
in the management, or, simply, it will raise some caution as to where some 
reforms ought to be thought out to rectify the pitfalls of the conventional 
role of the state. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BASIN-WIDE MANAGEMENT 
The area of Africa which is covered by the reticulation of rivers 
and lake basins, as mentioned above, is about one half of the total area of 
the continent. But in discussing the rivers and lakes, implicitly, the 
factor of interest is actually water which they carry, consequently, what 
could actually be done with the available volumes of water. And that point, 
in turn, leads us to some of the most critical socio-economic policy 
questions which Africa has faced in recent times, particularly since early 
1970's, which might be alleviated by proper management of water resources. 
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Ordinarily, community water supply for the safeguard of public 
health is considered the most pervasive socio-economic use of water. Some 
might mention also use of water in industries and even water transport; 
all these ;^an benefit from availability of bodies of water in Africa. 
But in actual fact two of the most critical uses of water that 
have relevance for the problems of the 1970's and 80's is in agriculture for 
food production and hydro-electric power generation; two most dreaded 
problems of Africa in the last decade and a half. Drought (defined as 
absence of rain water) is considered in general officialdom as having led 
to devastating famines and loss of human and animal lives. No single 
problem has ever mobilized e,Lual amount of international attention towards 
Africa, since colonization, as the emergency operation to deal with famine. 
And the underlying supposition is that Africa has not had enough water 
2 for agricultural food production! 
The second critical problem for the majority of African countries 
during that period is production of energy where most of them have relied 
heavily on hydro-carbons. Tha second villain in the poor performance of 
African economies has been tha prices of the hydro-carbons which were 
increased by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), since the so-called oil embargo which commenced in 1973. The 
basic argument in that context is that the countries relied principally on . 
hydro-carbons to fuel their :.ndustries, transportation, and domestic/urban 
operations. 
Surely, the two problems could impede operation of the econdmies 
of African countries, if there were, indeed, no alternatives to evenly 
distributed rainfall, and sources of energy other than hydro-carbons. 
But is that firmly the case? 
2. This is eloquently expressed by Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the 
Executive Secretary of UN Economic Commission for Africa and Special 
Representative:! of the United Nations Secretary-General on the African 
Economic Crisis in his "End-of-the Year Conference on Africa's Current 
Economic Crisis and the Prospects for 1985" issued at his Addis Ababa 
Office on 28 December 1984 where he singled out "Drought and Emergency 
Situation" as the dominant problem in 3. list which also included 
unfavourable global economic environment and the dramatic increase 
in Africa's external debt. 
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The volume surface water available is readily suggested by the reticulation 
of rivers and lakes as discussed above. The estimates of the actual volumes 
cannot be precise. However, K. V. Krishnamurthy, who worked for U.N. 
Economic Commission for Africa in the water resources matters has offered 
the following suggestive data: 
"Estimates of Africa's total water resources vary from 3,400 
billion m3 of water to 4,600 billion m3. An analysis of the 
measured streamflow in African rivers indicates that the 
total quantity of surface water in Africa's rivers and lakes 
is in order of 2,480 billion m3, the difference between 
this and the aforementioned estimates being a measure of 
ground water resources. More than 50% of the total water 
resources of the continent are in one single river basin, 
Congo/Zaire basin (1,325 billion) and another 25% in seven 
other river basins such as Niger (200 billion), the Ogooue 
(149 billion in Gabcn), the Zambezi (104 at C. Ana), the Nile 
(84 billion), the Sanage (Cameroon, 165 billion), the Chari-
Logone.' (Chad, 43 billion) and the Volta (40 billion)"3 
The study adds in the same page that the actual total water 
utilization in Africa was about 90 billion m3, which represents about two 
percent o:f the surface and ground water resources in the continent. That 
is to say, about 9 5 to 98 per cent of the African water resources is at 
present flowing only to replenish the ocean waters, but not put to any 
productive use by Africa. Non-hydrologists might not clearly imagine the 
magnitude involved, but Krishnamurthy, as a hydrologist, concludes that 
this is a colossal under-utilization of Africa's water resources and calls 
for immediate redress.11 
3. See K. V. Krishnamurthy, "The Challenge of Africa's Water Development" 
in Natural Resources Forum 1 (1977) pp.369, 371. 
4. Note, however, that more than three quarters of the total rainfall in 
Africa is immediately lost through evaporation, a fact which might be 
significant in designing water conservation projects. See Doc.No.E./ 
Doc. No. E. /CN. 14/NRD/WR/i/Rev. 2 (1976) op.cit. p. 6. Note further that 
the knowledge of Africa's groundwater reserves is not complete, as 
directed by some recent discoveries. Perhaps the most dramatic 
discovery is that of the lake under the Sahara Desert, which Libya is 
planning to exploit at the rate of 6 million m3 per day. See a 
feature story in The Sunday Times (Nairobi) December,22, 1985. At 
the same time, Egypt, under the late President Sadat already embarked 
on plans to expand desert agriculture by 500,000 acres3 using waters 
of the underground lake. See "Egypt's Desert of Promise" in National 
Geographic Vol.161 No.2 February 1982 pp.190 et seq. If there are any 
connections between the two aquifers then the two states might one day 
want to talk about jointly planned utilization of the water from the 
reservoir. 
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How about hydro-electric power as a source of energy in Africaf? 
5 
Again Krishhamurthy reports that in relative terms, one third of the 
world's potential hydro-power is in Africa and that the per capita potential 
in Africa is more'than three times the world average. He adds that despite 
that high potential, the installed capacity of hydro-electric power 
in Africa is only 5.6% of the total, and that the ratio of energy 
generation to the exploitable potential is only 2%. The relative figures 
are indicated in the table'below: 
Item Africa .World .Africa's share 
world total(%) 
1. Potential hydro capacity (MW) 
Installed capacity (MW) 1974 
(MW) 1975 
2. Percentage of installed 
to potential hydro 
capacity (19 75) 
3. Hydro-potential 
(billion of kWh (Theoretical) 
(Exploitable) 
4. Hydro-power generation in 1974 
(billion of kWh) 
5. Percentage of generation to 
the exploitable potential 
200,600 565,000 
9,050 340,000 
11,250 
5.6 
2,690 6,540 
1,630 5,000 
34. , . 1,43.3 
30 
35.4'' 
2.7 
41 
33 
2.4 
Source: UNECA Problems of Water Resources Development in Africa 
E/CN.14/NRD/WR/2/Re\.2 (1976) p.28. 
5. Supra note 3 p. 370. 
Even though the above data are only subject to detailed 
appreciation by an engineer, the point is made that while Africa has a 
large share of the world total hydro-electric power it is using very little 
of it, having installed only 5.6 percent. And this power, which is 
indegenous to the continenta might in fact be less costly than the energy 
from hydro-carbons. The task for Africa may be to consider hydro-electric 
power generation as an integral part, if not, in fact, the incentive for 
multipurpose water resources development in Africa. And it is conceivable 
that the hydro-power might enhance the use of the water resources in 
agriculture in order to get Africa towards socio-economic normalcy. 
But back to water and agricultural productivity: It should be 
clarified that apart from water, land is indispensable for agricultural 
productivity. The question might be asked if Africa perhaps does not have 
sufficient cultivable land, even if ' it has the water. Not so: 
6 
Professor Odero-Ogwell, then Secretary to the United Nations World Food 
Council, wrote in 1982 that Africa's agricultural la^ potential is immense 
and that land was certainly not a constraint. That -.frica's potential 
compares favourably with other regions, he says, is suggested by the 
7 following table: 
Region Potentially 
cultivable 
(m ha) 
Pres entl^ 
cultivated 
arable 
area (m ha) 
Pres ent 
cultivated 
(%) 
Average 
Period(yrs) 
Africa 803.7 193.7 24 r . 3 
Southwest Asia 46.0 50.9 110 2 
Southeast Asia 324. 8 270.5 83 3 
South America 814.9 85. 2 10 4 
6. Odero-Ogwell, L.A. "The African Food Problem and the Challenge to the 
international Community" (19 82) mimeo. , .. 
7. ibid Table 3 page Explanatory notes offered say that the average 
fallow periods are a very general estimate for fallow period required for 
one year cultivation (low inputs).. The figures for South America were 
only provisional. The percentage for the presently cultivated period is 
higher than 100 implying that land which is not suitable for cultivation 
has already been encroached on. 
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If both water and land are actually available within the continent 
then the constraint to agricultural productivity, (leading in large measure 
to the crisis) must lie elsewhere. In the paper under reference, 
Professor Odero-Ogwell points to the failure to adopt technological 
packages in agriculture as one of the bottlenecks. One instnace which he 
raises is that in Africa in 1977, only 1.8 per cent of the cultivated land 
was irrigated, compared to 28 per cent in Asia and 6.1 per cent in Latin 
America^. 
This in fact, may point to one of Africa's critical problems in 
agricultural productivity: There is plenty of water and land but it is all 
unevenly disributed and not managed, controlled and placed on land for 
agricultural productivity. Although other factors such as trained man-
power, implements and fertilizers may also be lacking in the African 
agriculture, as is discussed later in this paper, failure to manage and 
control water already demonstrated to be available in large quantities, is 
clearly.a central constraint. Therefore, the necessity for the management 
and.control of water resources in the lakes and rivers in Africa seems well 
demonstrated. 
Both, use of water for irrigation and hydro-electric power 
generation require control of the river water through damming; they require 
change in the flow regime. But while harnessing the river water for 
hydropower changes only the flow regime of the river, abstraction of the 
river or lake water for purposes of irrigation reduces the quantities. 
Indeed, irrigation takes the largest of all quantitative uses of water 
resources. 
S. ibid p.6. 
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Change of the flow regime alone imay mean that the water does not 
reach the lower riparians in the. . quantities and at the same time as 
under the natural flow regime, but that the same yolume of water finally 
gets there. Thus, this may offer only a limited basis for complaint by a 
lower riparian .against an upper ane provided that it can be demonstrated 
that the natural flow regime is restored .by the point where the river 
i 9 enters the territory of the lower one . Thus, a complaint or a claim may 
be legitimate if the flow is disrupted to the detriment of existing use of 
water in the lower riparian. 
• On the other hand irrigation will of necessity d^ninish the 
quantity of water reaching the lower riparian. For ongoing projects in the 
lower riparian states, the consequences of a sudden interruption in the 
quantity of water could be disastrous. But it may also be fatal for any 
planned projects. 
In any case, damming of a river usually have consequences even 
for the upper riparian states. The most notorious problem is the backwater 
effect resulting in the displacement and resettlement of population resident 
within certain reaches of the river. Examples of this problem are legion, 
but one of the better known instances was the construction of the High 
Aswan Dam which, with a height of 168 metres, was to extend to nearly 
700 kilometers southwards, with 250 kilometres out of that being in Sudan 
territory and affecting the settlement at Wadi Haifa. Fortunately, there 
was a longstanding consultation framework available between the two 
countries, within which they could resolve the issue. 
9. In Lake Lanoux Arbitration, the Tribunal rejected the claim by Spain 
that the French's mere diversion of the Carol River water and restoring 
it without consumption, constituted a breach of the Spanish interests. 
See Lake Lanoux Arbitration in 12 UNRIAA 218 also reprinted in 
53 American Journal of Int'l Law 156 (19 59) and Lauterpacht, 
International Law Reports (London: Butterwoth, 1961) p. 101 etseq. 
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More recently the backwater effect of the proposed Rusumo Dan on 
•the Kagera River, led to tough negotiations among the members of Kagera 
.—Basin Organization (KBO) because of its anticipated impact on the settled 
areas. The elevation of the dam would be in direct proportion to possible 
hydro-power production at other sites such as Kakono and Kishanda, apart 
from the high power production at Rusumo itself. But the point is 
illustrated by showing the various proposed elevations at Rusumo and the 
possible power production there as juxtaposed against the areas of the 
territories to be submerged by the dam.and the population to be 
displaced, as in Tables 2 to 4 below:10 
Table 2: Variants- of Power Linked to Water Surface Elevation at Rusumo Dam 
Installed Guaranteed Inter annual .. 
Power Output Output 
MW GWh/year GWh/year 
1. Rusumo 1345 metres 129 535 • 597 
Kishanda 214 : 1,026 ; 1,1.25 
Kakono 57 259 301 
Total 400 •1*820 2,CT23 
2. Rusumo 1335 metres 105 410 480 
Kishanda 210 820 1,102 
Kakono 54 207 286 
Total 369 1,437 1,868 
3. Rusumo 1325 , . 80.. . 270 374 
Kishanda 207 500 1,082 
Kakono 53 126 277 
Total 340 896 1,733 
10. Data are derived from Hydropower Development of Rusumo Falls: 
G-Economic Summary and Conclusions (Tractionel-Electrobel Studies 
June 1979, pp.6-8) and Development Programme of the Kagera Basin: 
Final Report Volume 3: Energy (Kagera Basin Organization and UNDP. 
February 1982) p.38. .. 
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Table 3: Land Areas Likely to be Submerged by the Dam at Different Levels"1" 
Water Total surface area submerged (2) Usable surface area submerged 
level Rwanda Burundi Total(3) Rwanda Burundi Total 
134-5 5 2.000 ha 11,000 ha 63,000 ha 17,240 ha • 5,600 ha 22,840 ha 
1335 33,000 ha 9,000 ha 42,000 ha 8,180 ha 3,210 ha 11,390 ha 
1325 20,500 ha 6,000 ha 26,500 ha 2,510 ha 1,220 ha 3,730 ha 
1) These areas correspond to the normal water levels plus an additional 3m 
2) Not including permanent areas of water (lakes, ponds, ..) already existing. 
3) The area to be submerged is not included in these figures. 
Table 4: The Number of People to be Moved and Resettled as a Consequence of 
Backwater at Different Elevations 
Water Number of Inhabitants Affected 
Level Rwanda Burundi Total 
1345 22,975 2,975 25,950 
1335 10,445 .. 1,610 - -12,055 
1325 2,220 535 2,755 
A number of points are illustrated by the foregoing data: They 
show that the power output is highest at the highest elevation at Rusumo, 
which is 1345 metres, for all the proposed installations. The converse is 
true at the lowest elevation which is 1325 metres. Correspondingly, the 
higher the level of the dam, the larger the backwater effect and therefore, 
the submerged area of land in Rwanda and Burundi. And the additional 
consequence is the number of people to be displaced and settled where the 
total is 25,950 and 2,755 for 1345 metres and 1325 metres respectively. 
That is the balance of opportunity costs for the hydropower to be produced, 
plus use of the waters _>f the dam for irrigation. 
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Given the high population density in the two countries the vehement 
objection to the higher levels of the dam was understandable. In fact, the 
controversy threatened the very continuity of the Kagera Basin Joint 
programmes. Fortunately, there was already the framework of consultation 
set up in KBO fbr the basin-wide management. On the Sth May 1981, the 
Heads of State of the KBO member states resolved the controversy and 
opted for the minimum dam which will create a reservoir at a normal 
operating water level of 1325 meters. 
The Rusumo issue also illustrates the fact that one dam can alter 
the flow regime and have considerable impact on the power potentials of 
other possible dams within the river basin, and at significant distances. 
Thus, the reasons for a basin-wide management are clearly numerous and 
compelling. 
III. JUSTIFICATION FOR STATE INVOLVEMENT 
The discussion of the significance of basin-wide management of 
rivers and lakes will have suggested some aspects of the justification for 
state involvement in the operations. In this section, the justification 
will be discussed in terms of the functional rationale, thereby, analysing 
some of the problems which necessitate, state involvement. The role of the 
state will therefore become apparent. 
The breakdown of the items justifying state involvement shows 
considerable analytic overlaps; at the same time, the items are susceptible 
to different levels of specificity and inter-relationship. Here, six 
br0ad items are found distinguishable. 
1. Treaty Requirements in International Waters 
It has been argued above that the regulation of flow regimes 
within a river, out of a lake or abstraction of waters for consumptive uses 
are likely to have substantial physical and socio-economic consequences for 
both the upper and lower riparians. Yet, the data on the unused water 
resources and their potentials in Africa are enormous. In fact, it is 
manifestly wasteful that African states have not taken measures towards 
complete utilization of the waters for, inter alia, agriculture, 
hydropower and navigation through flow regulation and management. 
Therefore, it is clear that the African States should undertake 
regulations and.management of the waters of national and international rivers 
and lakes. It is also evident that the management should be done on a basin-
wide basis. 
The foregoing two attributes require regional collaboration, 
coinciding with the scope of the basin, as a prerequisite. And in that 
context, a regional agreement setting out the precise framework of 
reciprocal expectations and the protocol for implementation as accepted 
among the basin states, is a prerequisite. It is only the states that would 
adopt such a treaty in accordance with the national constitutions, and as 
a function of the sovereign"'""1'. 
There are instances where the appropriateness of a formal treaty 
becomes an acute problem even if international co-operation is 
unquestionably necessary. Say, for instance, if the Gaborone dam, which 
feeds the capital of Botswana, was to carry so much water that it causes 
back-water effect flooding the territory of South Africa. And if the 
latter was to argue that the flooded territory is actually part of 
Bophuthattswana, a bantustan. The City of Gaborone, as a legal personality 
might find it appropriate to discuss the matter with anyone. But the 
Government of Botswana might find that discourse to be politically' 
embarrassing and unacceptable considering that the so-called independent 1 
homeland concept is unacceptable to the UN,and OAU. Yet for reasons of 
viability of the city, its inhabitants and industries, a solution would 
have to be found. Clearly, only the state can resolve the problem, as a 
fundamental national issue. 
11. Note that some national constitutions permit constituent provinces/states 
of the sovereign state, to enter into treaties in the specified subject 
areas. An example in point is the Convention on the Protection of Lake 
Constance against Pollution, signed by the Land of Baden-Wurttemberg, 
the Free State of Bavaria, the Republic of Austria and the Swiss 
Confederation on October 27 1960, where the first two are constituent 
states of the Federal Republic of.Germany. The text is reproduced 
in the United Nations Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963) p.438. 
The Convention entered into force in November 10 1961. 
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The treaty framework is easier to create before there is a dispute, 
and disputes are likely to arise once utilization of the waters begin. Once 
a dispute arises over water uses it is possible for it to end on a war 
footing, as was suggested by the late Fresident Sadat with respect to the 
proposed use of waters of the Blue Nile by Ethiopia. In May. 1978, the 
late President was reported to have said that Egypt would not accept any 
interference with the flow of the water of the Blue Nile, particularly if 
in its view Ethiopia took such a measure for political reasons11 
Yet, it is very difficult to ascertain that the motives for any Ethiopian 
construction is political and not based on vital socio-economic necessity. 
Then obviously the situation remains volatile and shrouded in 
mistrust, especially since there exists no framework for peaceful 
consultation between the two countries on such specific issues. Creating 
such a treaty framework is, therefore, a central role of the state and, 
given the necessity for water management one which should probably be done 
for every international river or lake in Africa today. 
2. The Nature of Water Laws in Different States 
As pointed out already, the central factor in the rivers and lakes 
management is water. Whether the river or lake is national or international 
in character, the issue is utilization of the waters by public or private 
entities within the nation states and such would necessarily be governed by 
the national laws, which laws may be prescribed and enforced only by the 
national authorities, according to their respective constitutions." 
11 bis. For further discussions see Okidi "Legal a^nd Policy Regime of 
Lake Victoria and Nile Basins". Indian Journal of International 
Law Vol. 20 July-September 1980, pp.394, 440. 
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There is considerable diversity in the water laws of various 
12 
African countries, as determined by their juridico-political histories 
Countries in Africa include those following civil law or common law and 
associated jurisprudence. But there are also those countries whose laws are 
influenced by Islamic jurisprudence. Yet a further category is where the 
original tribal laws existing prior to colonization, have co-existed with 
the European-derived legal systems. And these legal systems exist in 
Africa today; at times more than one variant in the same country. 
It is sufficient to point out here, without substantive 
discussions, that the various legal systems make distinction in matters of 
ownership and right to use water. For instance-'-3 , the common law doctrines 
arising from the English tradition, acknowledge only usufructuary right in 
running water and they adhere to the rule of prior appropriation as the 
governing principle among users. Ownership of riparian lands only permits 
a right to use public water and to allow it to flow continuously, but not 
ownership of the water v^ hich actually rests in the state. Under civil law 
traditions, water which comes under the public domain, belong to the 
public and may not be privately appropriated. But the governing principle 
is the doctrine of riparian rights which requires interests of all 
riparians to be protected. Thus, while the doctrine of prior appropriation 
vests priority in terms of first in time, first in right, the riparian 
rights principle requires equitable consideration of the rights of all the 
riparians. 
12. D. A. Caponera (Ed.) Water Law in Selected African Countries (Rome, 
FAO, 1979); Caponera, Water Law in Moslem CouBtries (Rome, FAQ, 1973). 
13. See discussion of these instances in Caponera, Water Law in Selected 
African Countries op.cit. pp.20-24. 
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In any event, it seems evident that because of the differences 
which might arise- from, the basic doctrines^on water ownership or user rights, 
the state would have a role in the harmonization of the intensified 
consumptive usage such as for irrigation or flow regulation such as to 
facilitate hydropower production, navigation and use in industries. It 
seems, moreover, that in each of these legal systems; the state has a 
central role in the regulation and control of use of water as a public 
resource. Only the state through its laws would properly provide the 
framework for regulation and apportionment of water among the various 
contending public and private users. 
3. Regulation Necessitated by Broad Base of Water Projects 
Water by its very nature is a pervasive substance; projects 
involving its utilization such as community consumption, irrigation 
navigation, and hydropower production tend to have multiple socio-
economic implications. Very often, those affected might not individually 
have enough political or economic power to alter the course of events 
affecting them. For instance, damming for hydropower production or to 
facilitate gravitational transfer of water for irrigation or to facilitate 
navigation may each present an opportunity for the other socio-economic 
activities. Concurrently, as seen in the case of Rusumo Dam, it may lead 
to loss of agricultural land and the displacement of population, 
sometimes in high population density countries as in Rwanda. 
These become socially or economically sensitive affairs which must 
require the intervention of the political arm of the state. But even where 
no detrimental effect is created, the very decision to dam a river, for 
instance, creates opportunities for other positive socio-economic purposes 
which an individual might not cherish but which a state might not want to 
waste. For instance, a decision by a private individual (actual or 
juridical) to dam a river and use the water for irrigation may create an 
opportunity for hydropower generation which only the national energy 
planners may appreciate and only the state can be in a position to co-
ordinate the opportunities. 
The same arguments, about the role of the state area are 
particularly salient where the subject is an international river. 
4-. The Magnitude of Resource involved 
The necessity for a comprehensive and basin-wide management of the 
waters of a basin seems evident from the foregoing analysis. At the very 
leasts the management should be planned on a basin-wide basis even if the 
actual implementation is taken in stages. That entails meeting the cost 
of the studies, and eventually for the projects. These can be enormous 
and considering the nature of the river or lake basin plans, such costs 
must fall on the state. 
The magnitude of the resources may be illustrated by a couple 
of instances. The member states of KBO have attempted the ideal compre-
hensive planning to include studies and implementation of projects in energy, 
agriculture, transportation, afforestation and health. The total cost is 
summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5; Summary of the Total Costs of the KBO Programmes 
STUDIES 
Energy $19,107,000 
Railway 8,586,000 
Roads: Primary 28,525,200 
Secondary 12,979,200 
Industries 180,000 
* Sub-total $69,377,400 
PROJECTS 
Agriculture: Rainfed $21,200,000 
Irrigated 53,361,000 
Energy: Dams 575,200,000 
Transmission lines 93,240,000 
Railway: Construction of network 1,39 5,663,000 
Rolling stock:.. 556,704,000 
Roads: Primary 327,792,000 
Secondary 81,120,000 
Afforestation 17,207,700 
Tse-tse fly 2,511,735 
* Sub total for projects: $3,120,999,435 
* TOTAL COST OF THE PROGRAMME $3,190,376,835 
Source: Development Programme of the Kagera Basin: Final Report. 
Executive Summary, (Kagera Basin Organization and United Nations Development 
Programme, February, 1982) p.73. 
The total amount, nearly US$ 3." billiou, 1.3 c>ilevity nn 
amount; even though one might suggest that it could be reduced by less 
involvement of the state in the implementation of some of the sectors such 
as agriculture, particularly the rainfed variation under the drainage 
basin programme. 
Never-the-less the amount is bound to remain large even in 
instances where the primary focus is in the construction of the dams but 
before the infrastructure for hydro-electric power or irrigation are 
included. In the case of OMVS , the primary plans are for the construction 
of the Diama and Manantali Dams. By mid-19 82, the OMVS was able to raise 
a total of US$ 821,816,000, of which US$ 156,362,000 was for Diama and 
US$ 572,319,000 for Manantali while US$ 93,135,000 was ear-marked as 
reserve. 
! 
The above total amount actually represented only 99% of the cost 
of the two dams and the immediately related works. Clearly, then, the 
total amount is just over one billion dollars; add to that, the interest 
on the loans and the total amount in 1986 could be considerably higher. 
The point is that the investment requirements can be enormous 
if integrated and basin-wide management is to be undertaken. And since most 
of the investment includes studies and basic infrastructure on which 
subsequent diverse investments would rely, only the state is able to 
undertake them. That applies to international and, basically, national 
management programmes. 
5. Establishment and Development of Basin Institutions 
Management of water resources as described above requires 
institutional bases far in excess of what a nation's private sector or non-
governmental organizations can provide. It requires high level and 
diversified management capabilities backed by research and institutional 
infrastructure - to ensure adoption and diffusion of appropriate 
technology and improved husbandry. A keen observer of the African scene, 
Professor Oder-Ogwell, has submitted that of all the regions of the world, 
Africa has the lowest rate of adoption of technological packages in 
agriculture . 
14. see supra note 6 p.6. There are only a few exceptions to this tendency 
and an example is the diffusion of hybrid maize seeds in Kenya which 
moved with amazing speed. 
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At the very foundation of institutional development is training 
of manpower, defined as the cadre of human beings capable of performing 
certain productive functions. This is a costly and long undertaking which 
is tn be seen as promotion of the productive value of human resources whether 
"they are later to be deployed in the governmental or non-governmental 
capacities. Very often, attempts to enhance the performance of a river 
or lake basin development is hampered by lack of qualified manpower, 
including agronomic researchers, engineers, managers or extensionists, 
however, one looks at the issue. In a study done by USAID and OMVS for 
integrated Development Project, it was observed from the outset that the 
institutional and implementation problems which must be resolved first, 
before positive results can be achieved are: 'i— i' i 
1. The lack of resources and qualified personnel to carry out 
extension activities; 
2. The lack of logistical support for field agents; 
3. A government directed approach to agricultural production 
encouraging the cultivation of specific crops (i.e. rice) at the 
expense of diversification; 
The absence of monitoring systems for training and production 
activities; 
5. A lack of understanding of farmers' needs and their 
participatory role in decision-making; 
6. A lack of integration for farming activities, such as cattle-
breeding or herding"-1-5. 
15. USAID/OMVS Integrated Development Project, Volume III Analysis of the 
IDP Training Component (Project No.635-0621, October 1982) p.4. 
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These could arguably be called basic institutional questions which 
can be properly dealt with by concerted role of the state, individually or 
16 
within a joint framework as was, indeed, discussed with OMVS in 1983 . But 
in fact, that is one of the basic problems for the Niger Basin Authority or 
Kagera Basin Organization, as has been ascertained in the direct interviews 
with senior officials of those organizations. And we can submit here that 
however vast the financial resources may be available, there will be no success 
with the development programme unless a competent and stable institutional 
frame work is established in place. 
6. Meeting the Requirements for Basic Infrastructure 
Basic infrastructure to support the management of river or lake basins 
include roads, railways, telecommunication facilities, laboratories, naviga-
tional support equipments, among others. They are generally akin to the 
institutional requirements and their construction and establishment is a 
proper domain of the state. 
The state may in fact plan to establish the basic infrastructure 
and later, to use various devices of rent and taxation to recover part of its 
investments from non-governmental or public entities which may enjoy the use 
of the infrastructure. In fact, the state should consider that as a serious 
option, exempting only the essential social service institutions, such as 
hospitals and community wat^r' supply points. 
IV SOME CRITICISMS OF STATE PERFORMANCE 
This section's principal purpose is to raise a number of caveats to 
state involvement in the management of river or lake basins. In the process, 
it may in fact point other roles of the state not discussed above. Moreover, 
most of the points raised below are inter-related; the breakdown is.designed 
for emphasis and analytic purpose. 
16. See, for instance, an outline in OMVS, High Commission, 
and Human Promotion Directorate (Dakar, October, 1983). 
Training 
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Five illustrative points are raised as follows: 
1. Over-politicization of Institutions and Programmes 
Involvement of the state in any matter is, ipso facto, a political 
matter; therefore, by actually accepting state role in the management of 
river or lake basins, the political role is automatically implied. In fact 
the political element will be present in most of the points that can be 
raised in this sectiion. 
The problan, however, arises when political considerations supercede 
all else, in institutional and programme matters. Very particularly, the 
over-politicization of the instutions commences with the determination of 
personnel to be employed on the basis of political patronage to the exclusion 
of merits and expertise. It is also possible that those who have the expertise 
in the relevant areas may be made to understand that it is not the professional 
qualifications that have earned then the jobs but that they are proper clients 
of the patronizing politicians, or in the alternative, plain nepotism* 
The critical question here is one of a politicized appointment which 
is subsequently backed by staunch political protection of the employees. Its 
consequence is that the appointee is aware that it is the political, 
consanguineous or affinal loyalties and protection, and not excellence in 
professional performance that will insure the job. And such are the persons 
who courageously resort to misuse of office, unfair enrichment, misappro-
priation of resources, and negligence of the assigned responsibilities. Very 
often, the resources of the institution are squandered on unnecessary or 
unofficial travels, including maintaining tight contact, or even performing 
political duties for the patron politicians at home to the neglect of the a 
assigned headquarter duties. It may not be a surprise that in such cases, 
executives of this kind will ignore or frustrate any assigned deputy,, knowing 
only too well that an informed deputy might reveal the irregular practices if 
he has access to the official correspondence. This leads to collapse of morale 
and apathy in the professional and support staff, with fatal implications 
for the organization. . -i 
In this case, the employee would be required to belong to FBI = 
Friends, Brothers or In-Laws. 
±uo/L)l: 2b5 
These characteristics often emerge in regional organizations, 
whether they be river/lake basin organizations or simply trade and service 
organizations where states are parties- Similarly, they are found in 
parastatals at national level. And the executive officers act with 
impunity because they understand it that even if pressure had to result 
in their removal, they often suffer no penalties for thier offences 
against the community. To this, the exceptions are extremely rare. 
In the case of the Niger Basin Authority (ABN) a great deal 
seems to be concealed behind the reported criticism of its Executive 
Secretary by the Council of Ministers meeting held at Niamey on 10 
11 August 19 8417. The eloquent understatement reported that the 
meeting decided to create an ad hoc commission to evaluate the 
performance of "the Executive Secretary not having fulfilled the 
expectations of the member countries". It was nearly unanimously 
agreed that the poor performance :of the Executive Secretariat had 
undermined credibility of ABN vis-a-vis the member states and the 
international financial institutions. As a consequence, financial 
contributions and donations were not forthcoming. Perhaps a decisive and 
instructive action will be taken at the end of the review, but again, 
this depends on the role which the states, particularly that of the 
nationality of the Executive Secretary, decide to play in the matter. 
It may in fact, vindicate the thesis of this paper by protecting the 
official concerned. 
The member governments of the Preferential Trade Area for 
Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) seemed to have evinced firmness 
and prudent action, in one respect, on what may be called the "Kiingi 
Affair". The man who was appointed first Secretary-General of the 
organization worked for only eleven weeks by which time a meeting of the 
Council of Ministers was able to conclude that he "lacked the highest 
standards of integrity, efficiency and technical competence expected 
of him Audit reports of the finances were also ordered, 
i7« International Rivers and Lakes (A Newsletter by the DTCD, United Nations 
New York, No.5 June 1985 p.12 has only a brief report on a Meeting 
of the Council of Ministers held at Niamey, Niger, 10-11 August, 1984. 
But these problems were evident for more than a year. 
18. Report of the First Extraordinary ,'Meeting of the PTA Council of 
Ministers, PTA/CM/EXT. 2 Nov. 1983. 
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because part of the accusations raised were that the Secretary-General 
had conducted himself contrary to the required standards of frugality, 
thriftness and prudence. But the action that might be taken in event of 
confirmed impropriety were not stated; he was summarily dismissed. But 
the partinent question must be, how was a person who evinces these 
characteristics appointed to the job, in the first place? 
A more interesting and rare course of action seem to have 
been taken by the states, members of the West African Economic Community 
(CEAO) where three former officials have been reportedly taken to court 
on trial on charges of embezzlement of funds while they were in office^ . 
They were no political dwarfs: the main accused, Mohammed Diawara, a 
former Ivorian Planning Minister, is supposed-to have stolen .the equivalent 
of US$ 14 million belonging to CEAO, and shared with the Senegalese who 
was the organization's Secretary General, and a Malian. The three were 
arrested in an exceptional event during the October 1984 summit at 
Bamako and kept in custody at the Burkinabe capital, which houses CEAO 
headquarters, until the trials were to begin on March 25, 1986. 
It is often expected that embezzlement 'of that magnitude was 
actually-?ncouraged by the kind of political patronage the officials 
enjoyed. And lessons from the CEAO experience can be elucidated only by the 
knowledge of what happened to the old patronage, in each case. 
O0e national level instance of a de cidely disastrous programme in 
river basin management is the Bura Irrigation Scheme in Kenya. The small 
programme conceived in early 1970's to settle 60,000 people (5,000 families) 
over an area of 6,7000ha was to be implemented with a consortium loan of 
US$91.7 million from the World Bank, Dutch and the EEC20. 
19. The matter is attracting wide international -publicity. See The Kenya 
Times March 17, 1986 p.8 and March 25, 1986 p.8. 
20. See some overview by Barbara Gunnell, "The Great Bura Irrigation Disaster 
in African Business April 1986 pp.18-20. For the specific views of 
the President see coverage in The Kenya Times January 22, 1986 p.l and 28 
January 28, 1986 p.9; February 18, 1986 p.4. 
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On a suprise visit to the scheme on January 21, 1986 the 
President of Kenya was riled by the scheme which he called a disgrace. 
He found eroded irrigation canals, abandoned plots, poor crops, tumbled 
down and insanitary housing, zebras grazing on irrigated land, and a 
i • 
general air of desolation and decay. Some of the problems seem to have 
originated from the inception of the programme. And the 'President 
ordered for the dismissal of the General Manager, who is a political appointee, 
but it took nearly fifteen years- before that could be done and perhaps 
it is to be expected that some punitive action will be taken against the 
top executives concerned. In any case, if some of the problems were 
recognizable at the inception of the programme, what happened to the 
purportedly rigorous World Bank pre-investment appraisal machinery? Why 
did the Bank ride along with the disaster for so long? Is it conceivable 
that a commercial or other form of non-governmental institution could have 
continued to pump money in a venture of that kind for nearly fifteen years. 
2. Tendency Toward Proliferation of Institutions 
State activities tend to encourage proliferation of institutions, 
even where such institutions are parasitic on resources of others. One 
functional line which could be accomplished by an existing institution 
would often be, to have another institution set up for it, and this 
happens at national and international levels alike. 
On the question of irrigation, for instance, Kenya has about eight 
public agencies involved. In many provinces there are National Irrigation 
Boards, a development Authority, and Provincial Irrigation Unit, all at work. 
Eventually, considerable resources are dissipated in administrative overhead 
costs rather than operational activities. 
This is a general synd^ Qiie. which is manifested with different 
intensities in different regions. In easternpemtral and southern Africa, 
there is the PTA, which perhaps concides, in part, with Lusaka-MULPOC, 
SADCC, Gisenyi-MULPOC, Kagera Basin Organization, The Great Lakes Community, 
and the East African Development Bank, Then lately, there have been 
arrangements to create a PTA "bank". 
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In West Africa, a 19 82 study mandated by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa found that the major obstacle to integration 
in the ECOWAS region is the existence and varying objectives of a 
multiplicity of intergovernmental rganizations in the area^1. The study 
found that there were more, than thirty such organize +.Ions with some of the 
countries belonging to more than twenty: Senegal - 20; Burkina Faso (Upper 
Volta at that time) - 22; Niger - 25, And there were 16 organizations on 
the subject of natural resources management alone. 
The effect is that the large share of the available resources 
goes to servicing the permanent secretariats of organizations which have 
no resources left for developmental programmes. Very soon, the states 
are unable to justify continued use of taxpayers' money to service 
institutions which ha-ve 110 development work to justify their existence. 
Only states with taxation powers and limited accountability 
can proceed with international institutions to that extent, 
especially if some of the instituitons are used only to regard political 
proteges, friends and relatives of those in power, with lucrative 
salaries and benefits. 
3. Mix-up of Economic Exigencies with Political Prestige in Projects 
All governments would wish to-be powerful and carry some 
prestige and osteptation around them and within the state. It has been 
argued that in a number of aid programmes, the goal has been for showy 
projects which are conspicuous to the public, even if they - are not the 
most economically logical ventures. The United States posed such an 
argument at the time of the construction of Aswan Dam in Egypt and 
Tanzania-Zambia railroad. The precise line is difficult to draw 
and the argument is often dismissed as blatant prejudice. But perhaps 
in some cases the argument may be verifiable and only caution should be 
raised here. 
In the case of OMVS some commentators have argued that it was not 
22 necessary to construct two dams: The . Manantali could have 
21. UN ECA, Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa 
(Addis Ababa, 1984). 
22. See "Dangers of haste on River Senegal Projects", West Africa 23 October, 
1978, pp.2083-2084. 
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regulated the flow of the water permitting navigation, irrigation, 
hydropower production as 'well as to prevent salt water intrusion upstream. 
They conclude that it was perhaps for the prestige of the Senegal, 
vis-a-vis Mali, that the Diama was to be constructed. 
It is also argued that in its haste to construct the showy 
projects, the states tend to overlook such socially vital matters as rigorous 
environmental impact assessment and the human aspects of the projects 
23 with the clear consequence that the projects fail 
An economic exigency which is often overlooked in the haste to 
construct the project is the cost of theca^f^^borrowed for the project and 
how it can be repaid.' The Bura Irrigation Scheme is classical in this 
regard. The total loan was US$ 91.7 million. But the President 
officially declared the project "a disgrace, a failure and the height of 
mismanagement". He then concluded that the real losers are "the future 
generation of Kenyans who will go on paying the World Bank interest on the 
loan". The haste is partly verified by the fact that even the soil quality 
is not what was assumed at the beginning. 
The financial requirements for the OMVS and KBO are clear from 
Section III (4) above. And if some aspects of the projects be for political 
images, rather than meeting economic requirements (with the investment in 
social services being cleraly distinguished), the implications can be far 
reaching and perhaps only a state could proceed so recklessly. 
4. Over-centralization of Institutions 
' - • . . * 
This seems to be the one folly of state involvement in river or 
lake basins development with the most serious and far reaching implications. 
Horror stories seem to recur in most of the instances that have been 
surveyed in Africa. The KBO, as a recent beginner, still awaits the stage 
of implementation and reviews to show if it departs from the existing. 
trends21*. 
23. See comments by Sophie Bessis, "Recalculating river development costs: 
the case of the Senegal" in Ceres Sept.-Oct., 1982 pp.21-26, and Adrian 
Adams, "The Senegal River Valley: What Kind of Change?" in Review of 
African Political Economy No.10 Sept-Dec. 1977, pp.33-59. 
24. Egypt and Sudan have not been covered in this study. They have the most 
extensj.-rro «Kp<arienc« in irrigation in Africa. On the other hand, Sub-
Saharan Africa is simply beginning. 
/ 
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THE OMVS as a development authority is going through the latest attempts at 
implementation. But the earlier record of management of the Senegal Basin 
underscores the folly with distinction. Accounts have been given of the 
work of SAED, the parastatal authority in Senegal responsible for organizing 
farmers and irrigation programmes in the Senegal Valley. As recently as 
April 1975, there were meetings held with the villagers' association for 
collective agriculture and visitors from the SAED accompanied by French 
agricultural technicians^. 
The evidence from the account is that the "experts" from SAED 
and the villagers were strangers to one another; they were not effectively 
communicating and evidently the villagers did not fully understand what 
SAED officials wanted nor were they interested in joining SAED because 
the role of SAED had not been clearly explained to thew. 
The management was totally inefficient, to say the least. 
While the original estimated cost was about US$13-14,000 per irrigated 
hectare, the eventual cost averaged between US$40,000 and US$50,000 per 
irrigated hectare25 bis. . This is m stark contrast to the reported 
cost in Mali, where a World Bank project costs around US$26,000, per 
hectare, under Sahelian conditions. 
Yet, the condition in Bura wasepermitted to continue for about 
a decade. And the pertinent question is whether it had to take a surprise 
helicopter visit by the Head of State to change the trend. A summary of 
one of the findings of the President was that: 
"The project managerial control was over centralized in Nairobi 
which resulted in major weaknesses in the procurement of materials, 
delayed reaction to the crises on site, poor financial and 
budgetary controls, and misapplication of project funds26. 
25 bis. These are figures given by Barbara Gunnell, Supra note 20; they might 
be on the higher side but they do, nevertheless, underscore the 
point. Estimates given in interviews with some NIB officials 
put the figure between $33,000 and $40,000. 
26. The Kenya Times February 18, 19 86, 
27 - IDS/DP 285 
And the President ordered that the project will, henceforth, be 
managed from Bura. 
This is important because the record of the National Irrigation 
Board (NIB) suggested that very often the management were totally 
insensitive to the -woes of the farmers. Accounts from their West Kano 
project evinces, perils and helplessness, as a settler at the scheme wrote 
to the press^7 complaining against the NIB which increases the costs to the 
farmers, paying less for the farmer's output and charging inflated prices 
(for farm inputs. In one paragraph he submits as follows: 
"Productivity has dropped. Morale is killed. The families 
affected cannot dress. No education. The farmer no longer 
believes the scheme was intended for his good. The NIB has 
become a reject, and it is suspected to be more of a 
marketing agency for farm inputs and equipment than a 
development agency. The NIB has impressed us with its 
devotion to negligence and the skill to frustrate and 
demoralize farmers". 
That is a farmer's description of the performance of a parastatal 
agency involved in a river basin development scheme at national level. 
As Sub-Saharan Africa goes into river and lake basin development 
schemes, there is need for close assessment of what is happening with the 
schemes at national level. Nigeria is one of the «ountries which should 
offer lessons because it has several river basin authorities. One indication 
seems clear though, that the record of the Nigeria's National Electric 
Power Authority (NEPA) which gets its power from, among others, Kainji 
Dam, is not actually glamorous. Although Kainji has a capacity of 760 
megawatts, the production level is less than half of that. Besides, 
indecisiveness kept the 700 megawatt gass-fired station at Sapele from 
commissioning for over one year28. In the end, NEPA became associated 
with rather unflattering full titles as "Never Expect Power Always" or 
"Not Even Properly Administered". 
27. See Sunday Nation (Nairobi) November 28, 1982, For additional comments 
on the Fiasco in the West Kano Scheme of the National Irrigation Board, 
see Sunday Nation November 14, 1982 Editorial. 
28. See the letter from Lagos by Eddie Iroh in the African Business 
June 1984. 
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It seems difficult to find a river or lake basin authority which 
has effectively decentralized and devolved authority to local levels of 
their regions in order to ensure effective implementation of projects 
through an involvement of the supervisors in the actual work, 
sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of the farmers. The lake 
Basin Development Authority (LBDA) in Kenya accepts, in'principle, that 
it should decentralize its project, supervision and administration 
but in actual fact, the practice is far from realizat±6n. By now, the 
LBDA has had just over two years of actual and serious project 
implementation. It is expected that its decentralization programme should 
commence in practice during the third year. 
Apart from the follies of over-centralization outlined above the 
practice also tends to assume that the local farmers are ignorant, 
irresponsible and passive entities who should simply be directed by the 
"experts", like machines. Very little attempt is placed on the 
encouragement of local initiatives and inventiveness by the local farmers. 
Nor do the over-centralized systems bother to mobilize local farmer 
organizations such as co-operatives as the actual agents of development. 
These points came out particularly in the 19 75 SAED encounter discussed 
above. The specific Senegal situation On the matter is elaborated by 
Thayer Scudder who says that devolution to local levels is often 
correlated with higher yields and that . :it increases the effectiveness of 
the responsible agencies2®. 
* 
But devolution to the local levels and mobilization of producer 
organizations must, of necessity, be accompanied by rigorous government 
role in institution building (including training of experts and farmers) and 
the provision of basic infrastructure. Granted, experience with co-
operative organizations in Africa does not have many success stories 
to offer. However., its history is short and so long as specific follies 
of state involvement such as politicization and low level of accountability 
can be remedied, there is some determination in Africa and examples from 
abroad which suggest positive prospects'^. 
29. Scudder, African River Basins, (Binghamton, N.Y. Institute for Development 
Anthropology, July 1981) p.37-38. 
30. See a brief account by Francois Huot, "Co-operatives in BurSina Faso: A 
spirit of Self-Development" and David Creighton, "Lessons from India: 
Success, the Co-operative Way" in • The IBRC Reports Volume 15 No.l, 
January 1986, pp.22-24. 
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V FINAL REMARKS 
The functional justification for state involvement in the 
management of river and lake basins development in Africa inhere from the 
socio-economic reasons for that very focus on development. It is further 
underscored by the established necessity for comprehensive and integrated 
approach to the management of the utilization of the water of the basin 
for, inter alia, irrigated agriculture, hydro-electric power generation, 
navigation, community and industrial uses of water. It is also a 
component of integrated development planning that the state should ensure 
measures to prevent negative environmental impact of the activities 
within individual basin states or in terms of trans-territorial 
environment injuries. 
Section IV has discussed some negative practices associated 
with state involvement in river and lake basin development. It is 
possible to indicate factors that are most forcefully inimical to possible 
developsents Politicization of the institutions and failure by the 
government to ensure accountability by those who are in responsible 
positions. People, who know ofl.'!.their political protection tend to retain 
that as the focus of commitment and to ingore pursuit of excellence in their 
work. Consequently, they resort to abuse of office, misappropriation, 
neglect of duties and plain pursuit of comfort. In Africa where a head 
of the judiciary has been honest enough to accept that corruption in his 
department "threatens to reach a point of disgrace and uncontrollable 
31 
destruction to the system" , political clientelism and lack of 
accountability in the management of the national and international river 
or lake basins can prove fatal to the organizations. The capacity of 
tax payers to keep subsidizing the inefficient, wasteful, negligent and 
corrupt system is obviously finite. 
31 Comments by Acting Chief Justice Madan of Kenya on Tuesday, January 21, 
1986 in an address to the Coast Province Branch of the Law Society of 
Kenya. See report in Daily Nation (Nairobi) January 23, 1986, p.<+. 
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In fact, every river/lake basin development authority should work on 
the basis of achievement targets set by their governing boards. Thereafter, 
individual Executives should retain jobs only .on proof of achievement. 
This rigorous ethic could be an effective part of accountability, and 
examples exist elsewhere, even though not in basin authorities. On 
Monday, April 7, 1986 Wei Yung-Wing, the chairman of the state-run 
China Ship Building Corporation resigned following his company's failure 
to complete on schedule two container ships ordered by a local firm. 
Financial resources which African states often seek from donor agencies 
will hardly insure development unless there is also impeccable 
commitment to achieve public goals, honesty and integrity in the 
management of public resources, and generally, a community-oriented ' 
enterpreneurship. 
The point is that in order to succeed, African states must 
act firmly and ensure accountability from their highest levels before 
they can expect performance at the farmers' level. In the end most of the 
productive work should be done at the local level by the small-scale 
farmers, collaborating through their organizations or through the local 
commercial enterprises. 
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Over-centralization of institutions and management tends to lend to 
inefficiency; neglect and insensitivity to the farmers; destruction of the 
morale and initiative of the actual producers; failure to stimulate the 
participation of the producers and their organizations in procedural and 
substantive ways; and eventually, the collapse of the programmmes in 
situations where accountability was already scanty. 
The state operations may also devolve to the local level in 
the form of autonomous but associated enterprises working as subsidiaries r 
of the parent institutions. The autonomy of the subsidiaries would cushion the 
subsidiaries from the financial failures of the parent or sister enterprises 
and, at the same time, permit the weak enterprises to collapse alone. 
The decentralization and devolution of management to the local 
levels should be accompanied by a systematic institution building to 
include high level training of experts; training of extensionists; 
mobilization and education of the farmers as individuals and within their 
organizations; and the provision as well as maintenance of the basic 
infrastructure. 
There is no substitute to institution building, if the development 
programmes are to succeed. But as a requirement, the organization must be 
able to train, attract and retain the managerial staff. It is not 
sufficient simply to train: under the aegis of the Niger Basin Authority 
(NBA) six persons had been sent for training with assistance from USAID; 
four of them had received master of science degrees by mid-1984 but none 
of than was employed by NBA. But that was also the Authority where the 
head of one of the four operational departments32 expressed frustration 
at the fact that since his appointment in July 1981, the chief executive 
had not assigned him even a single project by mid-1984. In fact, he 
submitted, the chief executive had frustrated every initiative he had taken 
to build up and execute a project. 
32. The 1980 Act by which the contracting States established the Niger 
Basin Authority established from Departments: Water Resources; 
Navigation; Transportation and Telecommunication; Agriculture; Fisheries 
and Livestock; Administration; Economy and Personnel; plus 
the Documentation Centre. 
